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ABSTRACT
The hardware and low-level software in many mobile de-
vices are capable of mobile-to-mobile communication, in-
cluding ad-hoc mode for 802.11, Bluetooth, and cognitive
radios.
We have started to leverage this capability to provide in-
terpersonal communication both over infrastructure networks
(the Internet), and over ad-hoc and delay-tolerant networks
composed of the mobile devices themselves.
This network is fully decentralized so it can function with-
out any infrastructure, but takes advantage of Internet con-
nections when available. Devices may communicate when-
ever they are able to exchange packets. All interpersonal
communication is encrypted and authenticated so packets
may be carried by devices belonging to untrusted others.
One challenge in a fully decentralized network is rout-
ing. Our design uses Rendezvous Points (RPs) and Dis-
tributed Hash Tables (DHTs) for delivery over the Internet,
and hop-limited broadcast and Delay Tolerant Networking
(DTN) within the ad-hoc network.
Each device has a policy that determines how many pack-
ets may be forwarded, and a packet prioritization mecha-
nism that favors packets likely to consume fewer network
resources. A goal of this design and implementation is to
provide useful interpersonal communications using at most
1% of any given resource on mobile devices.
Keywords
Infrastructureless Communication, Interpersonal Com-
munication, Ad-Hoc Network, Delay-Tolerant Network,
Networking Protocol, Priority Mechanism
1. INTRODUCTION
In the days of Plain Old Telephone Systems (POTS),
a company would buy or rent an expensive PBX to con-
nect the telephones in its offices to the worldwide tele-
phone network.
Today many individuals own an inexpensive packet
switching system to connect multiple computers to the
worldwide Internet.
Some people have already used smartphones or other
mobile devices as personal hotspots, obtaining Inter-
net access without having to purchase a separate piece
of equipment. At present, the performance of these
hotspots is very limited, and the hotspot itself must
have access to the Internet.
This paper is about using ad-hoc technology to ex-
tend the reach of personal hotspots both further from
the Internet and to a wider group of people than just
the owners of hotspots, to the point where people can
communicate even without the Internet. The goal is to
to provide low-bandwidth interpersonal communication
and peer-to-peer social networking without regard to
availability of infrastructure or ability or willingness to
pay for a commercial service.
Ad-hoc technology is inefficient and unreliable com-
pared to today’s Internet. The advantage of ad-hoc
and peer-to-peer technologies is that to work they only
need two or more suitable general-purpose devices. The
project described here, AllNet, is designed to take ad-
vantage of the Internet and other infrastructure when
available, and use ad-hoc and delay-tolerant network-
ing to continue delivering packets when Internet access
is not available.
Any project that accomplishes these goals is likely to
share these features:
• Support for mobile devices. Many people com-
municate using mobile devices. These devices are
wireless and self-powered, and can be used (for a
limited time) even without infrastructure, so are a
good match for AllNet.
• Distributed network access. It must be possible
to join and use the network without permission or
approval from a central authority.
• Usefulness at low bit rates and high latencies. Some-
times ad-hoc and delay-tolerant networking is all
that is available, an the network must be useful in
these circumstances. When better performance is
available through the infrastructure or direct con-
nections, the network should be able to take ad-
vantage of the higher speeds and lower latencies.
• Security. Since ad-hoc technology uses untrusted
intermediaries to deliver packets, all personal com-
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munication must be encrypted end-to-end. Public
communications can be sent in the clear.
• Authentication. Once I know my contacts’ public
keys, I can easily tell whether a signed packet is
from one of them or not.
• Social Network. Pervasive authentication of known
contacts makes it easy for my devices to keep track
of my social networks.
The first two of these features suggests that, unlike
the current Internet, addressing should not be based on
the point of attachment to the network. In AllNet, ad-
dresses are self-selected random bitstrings. Delivery is
by a combination of limited wireless broadcasts, sending
to designated Internet hosts, and network nodes self-
organizing into Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs).
While multiple devices might by chance (or mali-
ciously) select the same random address, in AllNet such
collisions just mean that the packet might be physically
delivered to multiple destination devices. If a device
receives a packet that it cannot decrypt, or that is not
signed by a contact in the owner’s social network, the
device automatically treats this as any other packet not
intended for this device.
The third feature suggests that one of the applica-
tions of AllNet should be a persistent chat system sim-
ilar to SMS. SMS already provides delay tolerant low-
bandwidth communications, but requires cellular infras-
tructure and is sometimes unavailable to individuals be-
cause of the way it is priced. With AllNet, such commu-
nication would take place over the Internet when avail-
able, and by ad-hoc and delay-tolerant networking when
these are available.
For example, an AllNet chat message might be de-
livered in much less than a second if both devices are
connected to the Internet. The recipient needs either
a public IP address, or must request packet forwarding
from another computer that has a public IP address.
In either case, this public IP address must be known
to the sender. If the sender does not know an IP ad-
dress for this receiver, the sender forwards the packet
to any node forming an Internet-wide DHT. If the re-
cipient has requested packet delivery from DHT nodes
corresponding to its address(es), the packet is delivered
promptly.
If ad-hoc networking is available, the same packet will
also be sent to the devices within reach of the sender.
Each such device forwards the packet if that can be
done within strict limitations on battery and bandwidth
usage. If the destination can be reached through ad-hoc
networking, the packet might be delivered in less than
a second, or after a delay of many minutes if one or
more of the intermediate and final devices turn off their
radios part of the time.
Finally, the device will store the packet for a while,
and make it available on request. To limit buffer size,
packets are stored for a limited time, with newer packets
generally replacing older packets, and packets for des-
tinations known from the social network being stored
longer than packets for strangers. If a packet is still
present in the device when the packet’s destination is
in range, the packet is delivered at that time, whether
that be a few seconds or a few days later.
To be useful with such delay variability, each chat
message is tagged with a unique sequence number1 and
the time of transmission. The destination chat program
uses the sequence number and timestamp to discard du-
plicate packets. Reusing a sequence number with a later
timestamp allows the sender to request that a message
be amended or deleted. The recipient is free to either
honor or disregard such requests, but usually the chat
program shows the latest version with an indication that
older versions are available.
This chat protocol is to date the best developed of
the applications of AllNet. Another significant applica-
tion would allow devices that are not connected to the
Internet to request web or email transfers through other
AllNet devices that are connected and willing to share
their access.
AllNet provides a way for two people who are mak-
ing contact to securely exchange public keys. The basic
mechanism is to transmit in the clear the public key,
together with an HMAC of the key and a short secret
string that the two parties have exchanged. Communi-
cating the secret string is easy if the two can talk di-
rectly to each other or have in common a trusted friend.
In the absence of these, the secret string can be commu-
nicated by other secure mechanisms such as a telephone
call.
We have designed and developed AllNet beginning in
the first half of 2012. Although the design is still evolv-
ing, two preliminary Linux versions (version 0 and ver-
sion 1) have been completed, and the implementation
of version 2 is underway. We expect that version 2 will
be sufficiently useful to see initial use among the public
at large, and we plan to port this implementation to a
number of mobile platforms.
The next section is the main section of this paper,
and describes in detail the design of AllNet. Section 3
describes the current performance and other interest-
ing features of AllNet. Section 4 surveys related work,
including a paper on AllNet previously presented at a
conference, other projects that overlap with AllNet, and
technologies that our design builds on. Section 5 re-
views present status, future work, and gives concluding
remarks.
1Sequence numbers need only be unique within any given
conversation, so 48 bits are sufficient.
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2. DESIGN
The design of AllNet includes a number of compo-
nents. We begin by describing (Section 2.1) the packet
forwarding algorithm, a novel and simple mechanism
that combines existing approaches to make AllNet effec-
tive at delivering data under a variety of circumstances.
AllNet is specifically designed to keep resource usage
below a specific, very low level for traffic that does not
directly benefit the owner of the device or the owner’s
friends. Essential components of this design include a
low power wireless forwarding algorithm (Section 2.2)
and a packet prioritization scheme (Section 2.3). To dis-
tinguish friends and assign them a greater share of re-
sources, AllNet provides an algorithm for keeping track
of the social network of the owner of the device and
anonymously sharing it with others (Section 2.4).
Finally, AllNet packets are designed to be public-key
encrypted. Rather than using certificate authorities or
a web of trust, the key exchange mechanism of AllNet
(Section 2.5) allows the exchange of keys among indi-
viduals who know each other or who know someone in
common.
2.1 Addresses and Message Forwarding
AllNet transmission combines wireless ad-hoc broad-
casting with Internet transmission.
Every packet carries a destination ID. These desti-
nation IDs are bitstrings up to 8 bytes long, usually
selected at random.
Should two people select the same ID, resulting in a
collision, the only consequence is that they might at-
tempt to decrypt each other’s packets. The decryp-
tion will not succeed, but the attempted decryption will
waste some energy.
Each time an ID is sent, it is sent with a one-byte
length field that declares the number of bits of the ID
that should be considered valid.
These destination IDs are used:
• As indices into the Distributed Hash Table. If I use
a destination ID I, it is usually to my advantage
to listen for packets from the DHT nodes that are
responsible for I.
• To avoid attempting to decrypt packets that are
clearly not for me.
• To prioritize decryption of packets that may be for
me, giving higher priority to the ones that have
more valid bits.
• To find out whether a packet is from an individual
in my social network.
Each node generating or forwarding a packet sends it
by:
1. broadcast on locally connected networks
2. broadcast to listeners
3. send to the DHT node(s) corresponding to the des-
tination ID
4. if on the Internet and we have mappings of ren-
dezvous points (RPs) for this destination ID, send
to the RPs
In each case, the forwarding is subject to AllNet re-
source limitations. As long as these limitations are not
reached, each packet is forwarded to all local nets, to all
listeners, and to all DHT nodes and RPs corresponding
to the destination ID. Otherwise, only higher-priority
packets are forwarded, as described in Section 2.3.
A listener establishes a TCP connection to any other
AllNet node. A node wanting to receive packets, on
the Internet but not itself part of the DHT, and per-
haps behind a firewall, might want to listen to several
of the DHT nodes responsible for the parts of the ad-
dress space corresponding to the node’s own destination
addresses.
Well-behaving nodes that are part of the DHT both
receive the packets themselves (handing them to local
applications), and forward the packets to each listener
in accordance with step 2. In this way, a node that is
not in the DHT may receive all its packets by being a
listener to a DHT node.
The fourth way of forwarding packets deserves closer
examination. It is only available when a device can
send Internet packets directly. Before transmission, the
device must have been given the IP and port number of
a machine with a stable, publicly routable IP address
that the receiver will connect to to retrieve its packets.
The machine with that IP address is a Rendezvous Point
or RP. A functioning RP will forward packets to the
receiver, which may happen either by prior agreement,
or by the receiver connecting as a listener to the RP.
A receiver may have multiple RPs that it listens to,
and give a subset of these RPs to any potential sender.
Having multiple RPs makes the system more fault-tolerant,
and giving different subsets to different groups makes
the network more resistant to traffic analysis.
A device may or may not have any mappings to RPs
for a given destination address. If it does not, only
the first three steps of forwarding are used. If it has
many such mappings, perhaps because the destination
address has few valid bits, the forwarding node sends to
a randomly selected subset of these.
In general, the usage of stable RPs is preferred to us-
ing the DHT, and especially more so if the RP belongs
to and is under the control of personal friends. RPs
somewhat resemble mail servers, allowing communica-
tion between a sender and a receiver that may not have
stable IP addresses or even be consistently connected to
the Internet.
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Symbol meaning
p target duty cycle for radio
p′ duty cycle for high priority
t time to cycle the radio and announce
t′ time for packet transmission
B transmission bitrate
Table 1: Symbols used in Section 2.2.
If an ack is sent in response to a received packet, the
ack may carry, encrypted, the IP and port of the RP
from which the packet was first received. This may be
used by the sender when sending further packets to the
same destination, prioritizing RPs deliver quickly.
Listening to nodes in the DHT corresponding to my
address is useful as a backup when no RPs can be iden-
tified, and is essential when first connecting to AllNet.
It is the way any node can pick an arbitrary string and
automatically have a public routable address.
The design of the DHT is modeled after the DHT in
Kademlia[1].
2.2 Sleep and Wake Cycles for Wireless
There are different kinds of traffic in AllNet. One
of the important distinctions are between traffic that I
(the owner of the device) have originated, traffic sent
by my friends, and other traffic.
In the first case, there should be few if any resource
limitations. The radio should be on whenever I wish to
send packets, and also whenever it is likely that I will
receive a response I am interested in.
For example, a cellphone walkie-talkie application could
keep the radio on at all times, possibly discharging the
battery relatively quickly to support low-latency and
high-bandwidth communication among devices that are
within range. But when my device is only forwarding
packets on behalf of others, I am likely to want to limit
the amount of battery energy used for forwarding.
One goal in the design of AllNet is that the network
should be useful even if resource usage is limited to
about 1% of the total available on each device. Rec-
ognizing that wireless transmission and reception may
consume significant power, this means the radio should
be off (or available for other uses) 99% of the time. More
in general, we consider duty cycles (fraction of the time
that the radio is on) of p or less, so the radio is off for
fraction 1− p of the time.
AllNet follows the general scheme of the Block Trans-
fer Protocol [2] by synchronizing senders and receivers,
then sending multiple packets one after another once
the sender and receiver have synchronized.2
2A simpler, unsynchronized scheme, in which receivers listen
fraction p of the time and senders send each packet 1/p
times, is inefficient when p is small.
To synchronize, any device with packets to send (a
sender) listens for announcements from other devices
that wish to receive packets (receivers). Once a sender
has heard from a receiver, a brief exchange similar to
RTS/CTS provides some protection against collisions.
The sender can then send a number of packets to this
receiver. Other receivers within range may also receive
the same transmission.
If a receiver takes time t to turn on its radio, transmit
its announcement, wait for a reply, and if nothing heard,
turn the radio off again, a receiver with duty cycle at
most p must sleep at least time t/p between announce-
ments. Accordingly, a sender wishing to reliably hear
announcements should listen for at least time t/p.
A sender has more information than a receiver, and
in particular, can tell whether packets in its queue have
high priority. For such packets a sender may use a duty
cycle p′ ≥ p, where perhaps p′ = 1 for the sender’s own
packets, and 1 ≥ p′ ≥ p for packets sent by the sender’s
friends.
If the sender listens for t/p and turns off the radio for
time (1− p′)t/p to give a duty cycle p′, then the worst-
case one-hop latency for a packet sent to a neighbor
within range is latworst = t/(p× p′).
If the bit rate of packet transmission is B and, once
two systems are synchronized, bits are sent for time t′,
the overall rate of packet transmission is B × t′/(t/p),
or pBt′/t. For example, if p = 0.01 = 1%, t = 0.1s, t′ =
0.2s, and B = 10Mb/s, the overall rate of transmission
would be 200,000 bits/second, or 20 packets of 10,000
bits each.
If the sender has high priority packets to send and
keeps its radio on all the time (p′ = 1), it will overhear
each potential receiver as soon as the receiver transmits,
after t/2p on average and t/p in the worst case. In the
example above, the receiver will send an announcement
on average after 5s, and always within 10s.
If the sender only has low priority packets to send
(p′ = p = 0.01), then the latency is 500s = 8m20s on
average, and never more than twice as much, 16m40s.
For senders that have experienced low rates of packets
transmission or have very charged batteries, they may
temporarily use a higher p′ to reduce the transmission
latency even when forwarding data for strangers.
The receiver can specify in its announcement the time
t′ it is willing to keep its radio on for receiving. If t′ >
t, the receiver may observe its overall duty cycle p by
sleeping for t′/c (instead of t/c) after receiving packets
for time t′.
To summarize, with this synchronization scheme senders
may send about O(p′× p× bandwidth) to any given re-
ceiver, and the average latency would be t/(2× p× p′).
Latency is minimized by minimizing t, that is, turning
the radio on and off as quickly as possible.
2.3 Message Prioritization
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When traffic is light, AllNet eventually forwards all
packets it receives whose hop count has not expired.
When traffic is heavy, senders must decide whether
and when to send packets. AllNet suggests that ev-
ery device prioritize the packets it sends, with highest
priority given to the packets the device’s owner wishes
like to send, and descending priority to packets for the
owner’s friends and then packets that benefit the net-
work as a whole. This last is hard to determine, but
AllNet suggests heuristics to favor some kinds of pack-
ets over others. None of these heuristics are required
for participation in AllNet, but supporting them may
improve the performance of the network as a whole.
2.3.1 Priority Computation
AllNet automatically prioritizes packets based on lo-
cal information available to the forwarding node.
The priority is a real number between 0 and 1, inter-
nally represented in fixed point notation as an integer
between 0 and 230.
To favor packets generated by the local system, local
applications are allowed to specify their own priority for
outgoing traffic. If not specified by the application, the
priority of local packets defaults to 0.875.
Similarly, if a packet carries a sender ID and a match-
ing certificate identifying one of the people to whom I
have agreed to give resources (a friend), these packets
are given a priority of 0.75. Certificates are discussed
in Section 2.5.1.
For all other packets, a variety of independent prior-
ities Pi are computed based on different information,
then combined by multiplying them together. Since
each Pi ≤ 1, any factor that produces a low individ-
ual priority gives a low overall priority for the packet.
Priority =
∏
i
Pi (1)
2.3.2 Priority Factor from Social Distance
The social distance d is defined to be d = 1 for my
friends, d = 2 for their friends, d = 3 for their friends,
and so on. The social network used to keep track of
social distances is described in Section 2.4.
When the social distance d > 1 of the sender is known,
it is used to compute a social priority factor Ps = 2
1−d.
As it should, this priority drops quickly with social dis-
tance. The size of a social network may be expected to
grow nearly exponentially with social distance, so the
computation of Ps exponentially decreases the priority
with increases in social distance. Also, Ps ≤ 0.5 for
d ≥ 2, so the priority of friends of friends is always less
than the priority for friends.
If the social distance is not known, and if AllNet keeps
track of the social network up to distance d = n, the
Symbol meaning
Pi component of priority computation
d social distance
Ps priority from social distance
h hops traveled
Ph priority from hops traveled
g hops to go
Pg priority from hops to go
r rate of traffic from one sender
Pr priority from traffic rate
b valid bits in a packet address
Pb priority from number of valid bits
Table 2: Symbols used in Section 2.3.
distance used for someone who does not appear in the
social network is d = n + 1. The current design keeps
track of identifiers up to distance d = 3, so a stranger
is arbitrarily assigned d = 4, giving Ps = 2
−3 = 0.125.
2.3.3 Other Priority Factors
The remaining Pi factors in equation (1) are based
on:
Pm the maximum number m of times a packet may
be forwarded. This field is set by the original
sender and never changes. Since traffic with lower
m is likely to require exponentially less network
resources, Pm = 2
1−m.
Ph the number of hops h already traveled. There is
some benefit to favoring packets that have trav-
eled longer distances, namely that a retransmis-
sion would be more expensive than for packets that
have not traveled as far. However, these packets
have already had more chances to reach their des-
tination, and in general it is wiser to favor local
traffic, so we use Ph = 1− (h−1)/8 for h ≤ 4, and
Ph = 0.5 for h > 4.
Pr the rate r at which packets from the same sender as
this packet has recently been received. This factor
discriminates in favor of known senders from which
we have not forwarded many packets recently. Un-
known senders have Pr = 0.5, whereas a known
senders that has recently used fraction r of the
bandwidth gets Pr = 1− r/2 ≥ 0.5.
Pb the number of bits b in the destination address.
Again, there are a number of reasonable functions,
and by default AllNet uses Pb = 1 − 2−b/2. This
function gives Pb = 0.5 for b = 0, Pb = 0.75 for
b = 1, Pb = 0.875 for b = 2, and so on, reflecting
the fraction of recipients who will not attempt to
decrypt this packet.
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These functions use only local information and infor-
mation obtained from the packet being forwarded.
Even in the absence of social network information,
these priority factors favor and encourage transmission
of packets that will consume the least possible network
resources.
2.3.4 Priority Forwarding
Since packets are sent in strict priority order, and
since devices generally limit how many packets they will
send, low-priority packets are more likely to be dropped
than higher-priority packets. Packets forwarded over
ad-hoc links are also likely to experience higher latency,
as described in Section 2.2.
Most packet networks have idle periods. During such
times all queued packets may be sent, including low-
priority packets. Since low priority packets may have to
wait for aless busy time, they may experience greater
latencies than higher priority packets.
Lowering the priority of a packet therefore increases
the expected latency and jitter (latency variation), as
well as the expected packet loss rate. This should en-
courage application designers to send packets that are
likely to be given as high priority as possible, for ex-
ample by sending packets limited to as few hops as will
reach the destination.
Closeness within the social network also affects pri-
ority. The next section explains the design of the dis-
tributed social network mechanism of AllNet.
2.4 Anonymous Social Network
Distributed social networks have been and continue
to actively be developed, including for example Dias-
pora [3], Friendica [4], and DiSo [5] (Distributed Social
Network). As for AllNet, the goal in these networks
is to foster decentralized interpersonal communication.
AllNet has the additional goal to continue communicat-
ing effectively even in the absence of infrastructure, and
specifically, to allow devices that forward packets to de-
termine the degree of connectedness within the social
network and therefore the extent to which to devote
limited resources to forwarding each packet.3 To the
extent possible, this should be done without revealing
to others the identity of my friends.
The social network graph is easily built in a dis-
tributed fashion in a manner analogous with link-state
routing. When I connect with a new person, for ex-
ample Alice, I can send her a list of information about
individuals in my social network, including for example
Bob, Charlie, Donna and Eve, who are in the set fme
of my friends. This information should include desti-
nation addresses and public keys used to verify packets
sent by the people in my social network. For example, it
3A more conventional distributed social network could be
built as an application that uses the AllNet protocol.
Symbol meaning
fD the set of friends of the owner of D
f2D the friends of friends of D
f3D the friends of friends of friends of D
|f | the expected size of a set f
Table 3: Symbols used in Section 2.4.
should include the address that I (and perhaps others)
use when exchanging packets with Bob, and a corre-
sponding public key that can be used to verify whether
a packet really is from Bob. The information would
not include Bob’s name or other personally identifiable
information.
If Alice (or anyone she shares information with) al-
ready has contact information for Bob, she can tell that
Bob and I are in each others’ social network. If she
does not know Bob, all she has are bit strings that she
can associate with one of my friends, without knowing
who that friend might be. In other words, she can add
the set fme into the set of her friends of friends, f
2
A. If
I send her information about the set of my friends of
friends, f2me, she can add the information to her set of
friends of friends of friends, f3A.
When I forward to Alice information about fme, I
only include the public key and address. Alice can use
these to verify that packets my friends’ send are indeed
from one of my friends (e.g. Bob), even without know-
ing who the friend is.
When I send Alice information about f2me, I send her
only the initial few bits of each destination address,
which she adds in her f3A. For example, this may in-
clude the first few bits of the destination address used
by Bob’s friend Frank, who is in f2me.
2.4.1 Calculating Social Distances
There may be times when a user might wish to prove
to a stranger that their social connection is of distance
at most d. For example, assume that Alice and George
have never met, but Alice is looking for somebody to
help her connect to the Internet, and George’s device
is the only one within range. We assume that Alice
does not know which of the persons around her owns
the device with which her own mobile device is commu-
nicating.
Further assume that Alice and George each have a
distant connection to Helen, who is in Alice’s fpA and
in George’s fqG, The social distance between Alice and
George is then p + q. Alice might benefit by claim-
ing that her connection to Helen is p′ < p, but the
information she has does not allow her to prove such a
claim. Instead, she can prove to George that Helen is in
fpA. George sends her a nonce N , and Alice returns the
HMAC of information she has about Helen, using N as
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a key. As long as q ≤ p, George has all the information
needed to verify that Helen indeed is in Alice’s fpA.
If q > p, that is, the distance from Helen to George
is greater than the distance from Helen to Alice, then
there must be some other person (a friend of Helen’s)
for whom both Alice and George hold information, and
who is closer to George than Helen is. In that case,
Alice and George need to find this person so Alice can
prove to George’s satisfaction that this person is in her
social network.
To search for people in both social networks which
are no closer to Alice than to George, without divulging
the details of the social network, Alice sends to George
a Bloom filter reporting the distribution of the hashes of
the information she holds about each individual. George
finds any matches within his own social network, hashes
them with the nonce, and sends them Alice part of
each hashes. Since the Bloom filter is an imprecise data
structure, not all of George’s matches will be in Alice’s
social network, but when they are, she can prove it by
sending to George the other half of the hash.
To see that this works in general, it is important
to understand why people are generally closely con-
nected, the anecdotal “Five Degrees of Separation”. It
is known that random graphs [6] have small diameters,
that is, the maximum distance between any two nodes
in the graph grows much more slowly than the number
of nodes in the graph. In order for a social network
to behave as a random graph, any two persons who are
friends with each other must also each have other friends
who are not friends in common.
To see how quickly the graph scales, assume that ev-
ery person has about 100 random friends, so |f | ≈ 100.
In reality, many people might have much more than 100
friends, but many of these will also be friends of friends
rather than selected at random. In any case, with this
assumption, the expected value of the number of friends
of friends is |f2| ≈ 104, and |f3| ≈ 106.
Then, if I compare my f , f2, and f3 with a stranger’s
f , f2, and f3, we are likely to find at least one person in
common as long as the number of people in the entire
social network is less than |f3| × |f3| ≈ 1012. This
number is more than 100 times larger than the current
and foreseeable human population, which is less than
1010.
In short, relatively small social networks that main-
tain information for up to about a million people in f ,
f2, and f3 are often sufficient for any two people to
determine the degree of their connectedness. This is
directly related to the Birthday Paradox [7].
2.5 Secure Public Key Exchange
On the World Wide Web, secure exchange of public
keys is mediated by a centralized Public Key Infrastruc-
ture (PKI) that depends on a number of trusted certifi-
Symbol meaning
s a secret known by two people
E the entropy of s, in bits
HMACx(v) HMAC of v using x as key
PKD D’s public key
Table 4: Symbols used in Section 2.5.
cate authorities (CAs). This PKI is used routinely and
is extremely reliable as long as the CAs can indeed be
trusted, which unfortunately is not always true [8].
The Web of Trust, introduced by Zimmerman for
PGP [9], allows individual users to certify other users.
A recipient Ian of a public key alleged to be from Juliet
may trust that this is indeed Juliet’s key if the key is
signed by Ken or Linda, whom Ian trusts to certify
keys. While the decentralized nature of the Web of
Trust makes it perfectly suitable for AllNet, this model
is still somewhat more heavyweight than needed within
a social network.
In a true social network, people generally know each
other informally, and frequently have out-of-band ways
of exchanging information.
For example, when Michael and I met at a social
event, I was able to give him my contact information
using only my voice, rather than a secure network. I
have never checked Michael’s ID, so I may trust him
with my secrets, but not with my money. If I later
learn that Michael is in fact Norm, I might still con-
tinue to trust him with my secrets. It is challenging to
use the Web of Trust correctly because human trust is
very nuanced, evolving, and implicit, which is hard and
tedious for people to encode in computer software.
If Michael and I want to communicate using AllNet,
when we meet at the party we exchange a shared secret
s, randomly generated by one mobile device and entered
into the other mobile device. If I enter the s displayed
on Michael’s device, my device can send my public key
PKme and an HMAC H = HMACs(PKme). Michael’s
device, on receiving a key exchange packet (PK ′, H ′),
can verify whether HMACs(PK
′) = H ′. If so, Michael
can be confident that PK ′ = PKme is my public key.
Only a sender familiar with s can generate a valid key
exchange packet.
The HMAC computation may use any common hash
function without substantially affecting this exchange.
The shared secret s is a nonce, usually randomly gen-
erated by one of the mobile devices, and useless to an
attacker once the key exchange is complete. So s can
be short and easily communicated as long as there is
little risk of accepting a packet from an attacker. If s
has about E bits of entropy, to avoid birthday para-
dox attacks, the packet carrying the legitimate new key
should arrive well before 2E/2 other key exchange pack-
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ets have been received (and if not, the exchange should
be restarted with a higher value of E). There are several
ways to accomplish this:
• When two parties are in direct transmission range,
packets with hop count h > 1 can be discarded,
allowing s to be very short.
• When two parties are not in direct contact, but do
have an out-of-band mechanism for exchanging s,
s should be longer and harder to guess.
Once the exchange has taken place in one direction,
the response can be encrypted with the newly received
public key, and explicitly carry the sender’s own public
key. This response can also carry a user profile, se-
curity information, and information about one’s social
network.
If there is no way to exchange out-of-band data, but
I want to exchange keys with someone who is a friend
of a friend, I can use a mechanism similar to the PGP
Web of Trust and have the intermediate friend securely
forward our public keys to each other.
2.5.1 Certifying Packets
.
Section 2.3 discussed ways to prioritize packets based
in part on the social distance between the owner of the
forwarding device and the owner of the sender address.
Section 2.4 described how to track the social distance of
sender addresses beyond the circle of friends. If packets
are to be prioritized based on this social distance, a for-
warding device must be able to inexpensively verify that
the packet was indeed sent by the claimed sender. To
do this, the sender must place into the header a 256-bit
digital signature of the encrypted packet body, signed
with the sender’s private key. The corresponding public
key is distributed through the social network described
in Section 2.4.
Successful certification proves that the sender address
in the packet header corresponds to the (possibly en-
crypted) packet contents. For an attacker to forge the
sender address, the attacker must be able to produce
valid signatures corresponding to a given public key.
The current version of AllNet includes in the packet
header a 256-bit digital signature. This is designed for
an ECDSA secp128r1 signature, but other signatures
that fit in 256 bits can also be used.
Packet certification is not always necessary, and un-
certified packets are well supported by AllNet, although
sent with lower priority. If a sender does not appear
with the social network of the forwarding device, the
packet will also be sent with lower priority.
Like sending a packet, verifying a signature consumes
a certain amount of CPU time and energy. In our tests,
verifying a 128-bit ECDSA signature took 0.3ms on a
modern processor, and less than 3ms even on an 800-
MHz celeron. Since a high priority packet may be for-
warded many times, the energy to verify the signature
can be less than the energy to forward the packet.
3. PERFORMANCE AND EVALUATION
3.1 Latency
Since AllNet is designed primarily for traffic such as
chat that normally requires low bit rates, latency is
more important than throughput. Latency varies dra-
matically depending on the circumstances of the com-
municating hosts. Each of the next sections considers a
different scenario.
3.1.1 Applications on the same system
To obtain a baseline measurement, we wrote a simple
AllNet client to send a 200-byte packet via the AllNet
daemon, and record the time (using gettimeofday) un-
til the response was returned. The AllNet daemon re-
turns all packets to all local listeners, and therefore all
applications can expect to get back every packet they
send.
On one system (system A), a 2.5GHz dual-core pen-
tium E5200 running 64-bit Ubuntu Linux 12.04, over
10 trials, the time to receive the message varied from a
minimum of 0.250ms to a maximum of 0.380ms, with a
mean of 0.289ms and a median of 0.273ms.
The same setup tested on a commercial virtual ma-
chine (system B) had times ranging from 0.443ms to
0.754ms, with a mean and median of 0.580ms.
3.1.2 Direct internet connection
The same simple client was modified to add a map-
ping (as described in Section 2.1) to an RP across the
Internet, so that packets would also be forwarded to
one other system across the Internet. We also modi-
fied the client so the recipient would immediately reply.
The two systems in this test were the same as in the
previous test.
With this setup, the times ranged from 124ms to
128ms with both mean and median of 127ms from sys-
tem A to system B, and from 125ms to 128ms with both
mean and median of 126ms from system B to system A.
For comparison, ping sent 10 packets (56-byte pay-
loads) between the two systems. From system A to
system B, ping reported an average round-trip time of
84.873ms, and in the opposite direction 84.846ms, in
both cases with variation (mdev) of less than 0.5ms.
A discussion of this performance is in Section 3.1.4.
3.1.3 Internet connection via another node
To further test forwarding over the Internet, we added
a third device (system C), a 930MHz Pentium-III run-
ning 32-bit Ubuntu Linux 12.04, which is on the same
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network as system A (ping times from system A aver-
age 0.189ms). The two daemons on systems A and B
were given a mapping to systems C for the destination
address of the packets.
With this arrangement, the times were very similar
to the times with the direct connection, ranging from
126ms to 132ms (both mean and median of 129ms) from
system A to system B, and from 124ms to 129ms (mean
of 127ms and median of 128ms) from system B to sys-
tem A.
We verified that packets were indeed being sent over
system C by stopping the daemon on system C and
finding that packets no longer made it to the other side.
3.1.4 Pure ad-hoc forwarding
We also tested sending packets over wireless ad-hoc
networks. Again, this implementation has yet to be
optimized. For example, the interface is placed into
ad-hoc mode by calling iw and ifconfig. In 10 tests
on system A, calling iw and ifconfig to turn on the
interface and place it in ad-hoc mode, then turning the
interface off again, took between 98ms and 190ms, with
a mean of 160ms and a median of 164ms.
Because of this substantial time to turn the interface
on and off, we tested the latency of the wireless system
without ever turning off the wireless interface. This test
resembles the previous tests, but the packets were sent
from system A and returned by system D, a 1.2GHz
Core 2 Duo running 64-bit Ubuntu Linux 12.04.
In this test, packets were sent wirelessly over a direct
connection using 802.11 ad-hoc mode.
The round-trip times ranged from 44ms to 60ms with
mean of 48ms and median of 47ms from system A to
system D, and from 17ms to 58ms with mean of 41ms
and median of 45ms from system D to system A.
On the same connection, ping reported round-trip
times between 2.4ms and 15.2ms, averaging to 6.2ms
with mdev of 4.3ms.
For this test, as for the test over the Internet con-
nections, round trips took about 42ms more than ping
round trips, though in this case AllNet had a two round
trips that took less than 20ms. There must be some-
thing in the software that causes this delay, but not for
every packet. It remains for future work to find and
remedy this delay.
We also tested a mixed network, with system D send-
ing packets wirelessly to system A, which forwarded the
packets over a low-latency internet connection to sys-
tem C. The times measured were similar to the times
over the wireless connection alone.
3.2 Storage for Delay Tolerant Network
In a DTN, packets are delivered when a device carry-
ing the packet is within range of the packet destination.
The latency thus varies depending on the human choices
that cause mobile devices to come within range, and can
vary from minutes to days or longer. Ignoring the la-
tency, we instead consider how much storage is needed
to deliver packets.
Suppose two people and their devices meet occasion-
ally. Once the devices are in range they immediately
exchange all stored packets intended for each other and
all packets intended for common acquaintances.
If every person in the DTN has F friends and sends
mb bytes to each of these friends in between meetings,
each device must have mb× F bytes of storage just for
the packets sent by the owner of the device. If F = 100
and mb = 100, 000 bytes (scenario 1), the device needs
10MB of storage for this data. If (scenario 2) the data
contains multimedia so that mb = 100MB, the device
needs 10GB for the owner’s data.
To also store the messages for the owner’s friends re-
quires storing mb×F bytes for each of the F friends of
the owner, or mb × F 2. In scenario 1 this requires at
least 1GB of storage, and in scenario 2 1TB.
Scenario 1 (textual data) seems very feasible today.
Multimedia data (scenario 2) is feasible today if a device
only stores its own data, and in the foreseeable future
it may very well be possible to store even friends’ mul-
timedia.
3.3 Efficiency
Broadcast is typically seen as an inefficient technology
because it can deliver packets to recipients that have no
use for them.
Classical Ethernet [10], for example, unless the inter-
face is in promiscuous mode, uses a hardware mech-
anism to efficiently discard received packets that do
not match the receiver’s address. Modern Ethernet has
largely stopped broadcasting, unless the broadcasts is
required as for ARP or DHCP.
Broadcast also has a few advantages. Addressing is
optional on a broadcast network, as long as the recip-
ient can figure out which packets to use. On a physi-
cal broadcast medium, multiple devices may obtain the
same packet from a single transmission, although the
benefits of this are only infrequently realized. A secu-
rity benefit of broadcast is that a packet is delivered to
its destination without revealing which of the receiving
nodes is the destination.
Ad-Hoc networks have additional efficiency challenges.
For example, a node receiving, then rebroadcasting a
packet keeps the medium busy for at least two packet
transmission times. Multiple nodes retransmitting the
same message have to delay the transmission by a ran-
dom amount to try to avoid collisions.
While future versions of AllNet may attempt to ad-
dress some of these inefficiencies, already AllNet offers
senders a choice between packets that are more likely
to be delivered with high priority and low latency, and
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packets that contain less information to thwart traffic
analysis.
Further, AllNet puts a limit on how many resources
will be used to forward packets. Even if efficiency is low,
at worst this limits the number of AllNet packets that
are successfully sent, rather than affect the resources
(battery and spectrum) used for AllNet.
If AllNet is used mostly for interpersonal communi-
cation of text messages, the inefficiency is not likely to
be a concern. It is only if larger amounts of data are
exchanged over the wireless medium that the design of
AllNet might need to be revised to improve the effi-
ciency. Future work may explore the improvements in
efficiency obtained by use of routing protocols and of
scheduled wireless transmissions.
3.4 Security Considerations
All user data in AllNet that is not sent in the clear,
is encrypted and signed, so the data is kept confidential
and the recipient knows that the sender has a private
key corresponding to the public key of one of its con-
tacts. Unless the keys are compromised (or the algo-
rithms are broken), the data is secure. AllNet applica-
tions currently use 4,096-bit RSA keys, but this choice
can be changed easily and without impacting the un-
derlying implementation of AllNet.
Good key management practices require that keys be
backed up securely. For AllNet, we plan to allow one de-
vice to advertise as its own multiple keys, including both
multiple keys on the same device, and also other keys
on other devices belonging to the same owner. Anyone
sending to this owner would normally send to all the
owner’s devices. Recipients of packets signed by any of
the keys can trust that the packet is sent by the owner
of all the keys. In case one device is compromised, the
other device(s) can still send secure and authenticated
packets to the owner’s contacts, informing them of the
situation and helping to alleviate any problems.
Data that is sent in the clear is not kept confiden-
tial. While further experience is needed, we expect that
data sent in the clear will normally be ignored by users,
unless (a) it is signed by a governmental authority us-
ing a recognizable key, or (b) the user is searching for a
business nearby, has recognized an emergency situation,
or has other reasons for wanting to read packets from
strangers. In any case, the software can clearly mark for
the user which packets are and are not authenticated.
Assuming that these mechanisms function as designed,
remaining security challenges include traffic analysis and
denial of service attacks. The wireless medium is par-
ticularly vulnerable to these attacks, since attackers can
overhear or inject traffic without a physical connection.
As mentioned in Section 3.3, in AllNet it is up to
the sender of a packet to choose between packets that
are more secure and packets that are more likely to be
delivered. More secure packets give fewer or no bits of
the sender or destination ID, and have no certificate to
indicate who might have sent them. Both of these fea-
tures make it harder for a listener to figure out where
the packet is coming from, and therefore help resist traf-
fic analysis. There may be circumstances where this is
appropriate, and other circumstances where it is prefer-
able to be vulnerable to traffic analysis but have a higher
probability that the packet will reach its destination.
Interestingly, denial of service is in some ways the ex-
act opposite from traffic analysis. The denial of service
attack can usually be stopped if the source of the attack
is found, so an attacker is likely to want to send untrace-
able packets as much as possible. However, AllNet for-
wards these very packets only after all higher priority
traffic has been sent, giving the attacker a choice be-
tween traceability and ineffectiveness. As a result, an
effective denial of service attack probably requires, as
it often does at present, taking over devices belonging
to others. With AllNet, even this is not a very good
strategy for the attacker, since the recipient of the at-
tack can use the authentication to identify the sending
device.
One final security consideration is the concern that
if mobile devices are used as identification and keys to
access resources, they become more valuable targets of
attack. Fortunately, manufacturers of mobile devices
and mobile operating systems seem to be familiar with
the issue of securing devices, and continued progress in
this area may be expected.
3.5 Ethical Considerations
Any powerful technology, including encryption, can
be used for positive as well as negative purposes. En-
cryption is widely used by very diverse people, including
bankers, criminals, whistleblowers, terrorists, military,
and human rights campaigners.
To the extent that AllNet is successful and properly
implemented and used, it will provide a large number
of individuals with the ability to hold private conversa-
tions with any number of individuals they have made
contact with. It will give recipients the technical abil-
ity to discriminate based on the sender of packets, if
known, or based on the sender not being known. The
only way for even legitimate governments to directly
obtain this information would be to run software on the
mobile device or obtain the physical device and defeat
its security.
The decentralization of network function should make
it much more difficult than at present for whoever con-
trols the infrastructure to prevent others from commu-
nicating with their peers or to control the contents of
the communication.
There are many ethical considerations to transferring
to individual control the power over one’s own commu-
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nications. Without trying to provide an answer to the
age-old tension that more or less balances centralized
and individual powers, community and freedom, it is
worth pointing out some of the advantages of personal
control over personal communications:
• Privacy is enhanced when fewer people can control
or intercept others’ communications.
• Freeing the means of communication means peo-
ple may communicate without as much concern for
economic or political considerations.
• It is harder for a powerful person or government to
spy on or interrupt the communications of weaker
persons.
• Decentralized selection of IDs make it harder to
automatically associate packets with people.
There are also related disadvantages:
• Even legitimate governments (or parents) may be
unable to reveal information that would lead to
social (or family) benefits.
• The relative anonymity of AllNet might in some
cases, and especially in the case of unencrypted
messages, lead to a lack of accountability that could
favor abusive use of the network, including cyber-
bullying. Such abusive use is less of an issue if
unauthenticated messages are ignored.
• When non-experts maintain a secure system, the
chances of accidental loss of security or loss of data
are higher than when experts provide the security.
4. RELATED WORK
Most of the related work used in the design of All-
Net was described in Section 2. This section compares
AllNet to similar projects, for each briefly outlining sim-
ilarities and then focusing on substantial differences.
Section 4.5 describes a previous publication on AllNet,
and outlines the substantial changes made to the project
since that time and the substantial differences between
this paper and the prior.
4.1 Ad-Hoc Networks, DTNs, and DHTs
There has been much research on Ad-Hoc Networks,
beginning with the early work in MANETs [11] and
including fundamental work on Ad-Hoc networks [12].
The design of AllNet builds on these and many more
results.
There is a plethora of routing protocols for wireless
networks. While this version of AllNet uses broadcast-
ing instead of routing on the ad-hoc portion of the net-
work, future updates may use protocols such as OLSR [13]
or AODV [14].
Delay Tolerant Networks [15] have also been the sub-
ject of much research, which again the design of AllNet
builds on.
The same is true for Distributed Hash Tables [16, 17,
18, 19]. The field of DHTs has had many developments
to support active peer-to-peer communities, and many
systems used on a daily basis. Although the DHT for
AllNet is not yet implemented, we plan to follow the
design of Kademlia [1] because of its flexibility and re-
dundancy.
While AllNet builds on previous work in all these ar-
eas, it is unique in combining these areas to create a
new network with the specific purpose of providing in-
terpersonal communication both with and without the
infrastructure.
4.2 Emergency Wireless Networking
Many people have known for a long time that wireless
communications can be useful when the infrastructure
fails, and especially in emergencies. Even before the
era of digital wireless networks, amateur radio opera-
tors provided communications in case of earthquakes or
other major disasters. The characteristics of these (of-
ten ad-hoc) systems shared by the wireless portion of
AllNet include communication over low bit rate chan-
nels.
Specific recent projects in this field include Lifenet [20]
and the CDAC TERA network [21, 22]. The latter is
infrastructure-based and relatively expensive, but has
the advantage of working with unmodified mobile de-
vices and being available to relief agencies.
Lifenet, like AllNet, is designed to work well even
without the infrastructure yet can use the infrastruc-
ture when available. Lifenet also has focused more than
AllNet on good routing protocols to support larger ad-
hoc networks and higher-bandwidth applications than
would work well using only broadcast. In the future, we
may adapt AllNet to use this routing protocol, called
simply Flexible Routing.
Unlike Lifenet, AllNet focuses on providing at least
low-bandwidth communication whenever possible. We
also strongly believe that a protocol, to be useful in
emergencies, should also be useful in daily lives. Only
by having users accustomed to the software and pre-
pared to use it under normal circumstances will they be
able to make good use of it in an emergency.
To support daily use, the design of AllNet has focused
strongly on security and the maintenance of social net-
works. Both security and social networks can be bene-
ficial in emergencies as in daily lives. The development
of specific applications is also essential to daily use.
4.3 Secure Decentralized Networks
Three main efforts towards providing secure, anony-
mous networks are Tor, Freenet, and Bitcoin.
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Tor [23] is designed to provide anonymity and security
for Internet access, and does so through onion routing,
where messages are repeatedly encrypted and slowly de-
crypted as they make their way through the network.
Routers may issue fake messages to try to defeat traffic
analysis.
Unlike Tor, AllNet does not decrypt packets as they
are forwarded, instead relying on end-to-end encryption
between trusted hosts. Fundamentally, in Tor a user
must, to a however minimal extent, trust the routers in
the network, whereas in AllNet the user must trust his
or her device and the device(s) of the recipient of the
message. Trusting the routers might be a good strategy
in a fixed network with known routers, but is not likely
to work well in a dynamically changing ad-hoc network
such as envisioned for AllNet.
Freenet [24] is a content distribution network designed
to automatically distribute content while concealing both
the source and consumers of the content. These anonymity
goals resemble the anonymity goals of AllNet, where a
device forwarding a packet may not know where the
packet is coming from or who the intended recipient
might be. Somewhat similar to the social network in
AllNet, Freenet has a Darknet mode where communi-
cation is routed through people to whom one has manu-
ally set up a connection. Also like AllNet, Freenet uses
a system similar to DHTs to locate data, and has a no-
tion of broadcasting requests until they either arrive or
time out.
Like Tor, and unlike AllNet, Freenet is designed pri-
marily to be supported by infrastructure networks. Also,
Freenet focuses more on storing and delivering immutable
data objects rather than facilitating dynamic and time
sensitive communication among individuals. Also, Freenet
tries to optimize paths to specific destinations by bring-
ing nodes closer together when they exchange informa-
tion. In AllNet, nodes aware of how they can be reached
explicitly communicate that information to other nodes
in their social networks.
Intriguingly, the Bitcoin system [25] provides anonymity
without resorting to encryption, and provides authenti-
cation without any need for personal identifiers.4 Like
AllNet, Freenet, and Tor, Bitcoin is completely decen-
tralized. Like AllNet, data in Bitcoin is time sensitive
but some delay is normal. Like all these other tech-
nologies, Bitcoin is most effective on systems that are
well connected to the global Internet, but unlike these
technologies, AllNet is designed to also work well with
intermittent or no connection to the Internet.
And while the Bitcoin network can be used to store
and communicate arbitrary information, its main pur-
pose is to store and transfer value, and in that, Bitcoin
4Just as intriguingly, the original author of Bitcoin has man-
aged to maintain his personal anonymity, being known only
by the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto.
is quite different from AllNet (and Tor and Freenet).
The lack of identities and of a social network are fur-
ther distinctions between Bitcoin and AllNet.
4.4 Interpersonal Communication Systems
A number of infrastructure-based systems provide human-
to-human text based communication using short mes-
sages. The two most famous are Short Message Service,
also known as SMS or text messaging, and Twitter.
Both have been tremendously successful while severely
limiting the length of individual messages.
These systems have provided substantial inspiration
in the development of AllNet, forever reminding us that
even short communications can be extremely useful.
Unlike AllNet, these services require infrastructure,
are proprietary, and in the case of SMS, are often quite
expensive. For example, a single SMS message requires
fewer bits and lower quality of service than one second
of voice calling, but is sometimes priced higher than one
minute of conversation.
And this is the other inspiration for AllNet: an aware-
ness that such services should be available as widely as
possible, without the expense and control that some-
times accompanies the need for infrastructure.
4.5 Previous Publication on AllNet
AllNet was first described at a conference in 2012 [26].
The substantial documentation and the source code (avail-
able under a BSD-style licence) have also been posted
to the AllNet main web site [27].
The fundamental idea has not changed since then.
We are developing a technology to support interper-
sonal communication over both the Internet and ad-hoc
networks of personal mobile devices. However, we have
done a lot of work to improve AllNet since that publica-
tion. In particular, the earlier paper described version 0
of the protocol, whereas this paper describes version 2.
The changes are numerous, and though many are small,
some are significant.
Version 2, for example, has a completely redesigned
header and address. In version 0 there was no DHT and
forwarding was by limited broadcast or to a specific ad-
dress. The applications had to do source routing, for-
warding by the AllNet daemon was very complicated,
and addresses were complicated as well. Specific kinds
of addresses in Version 0 included IPv4 and IPv6 ad-
dresses and several different addresses for different kind
of broadcasts. Version 0 also required senders to know a
lot about the topology of the network and how to reach
a peer.
Replacing all these addresses with arbitrary bitstrings,
and optional mappings from bitstrings to IP addresses,
makes the system more robust and allows for improved
performance when better information is available, for
example about RPs. Likewise, the DHT improves per-
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formance by reducing the need for broadcasting.
The structure of the AllNet daemon implementation
is new and considerably simpler in Version 2, and the
applications have been substantially redesigned as well.
The key exchange mechanism is similar but has been
improved by using HMAC instead of simple hashes,
and the chat protocol has been improved by adding
per-conversation persistent counters and timestamps to
messages.
This paper also includes over 6 months’ worth of ex-
perience with both implementing Version 1 and begin-
ning to implement Version 2, as well testing and learn-
ing what works and what doesn’t. None of this was
available at the time the previous paper was written
or presented. And because this paper is more substan-
tial than the one presented in the conference (14 rather
than 6 pages), we have been able to include a lot more
information about how AllNet accomplishes its goals.
5. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
5.1 Implementation Status
This paper reflects the design and preliminary imple-
mentation of Version 2 of AllNet.
What has been implemented and tested is the All-
Net daemon, which forwards packets based on prior-
ity both on the Internet and across wireless interfaces.
This preliminary implementation includes dropping du-
plicate packets, supporting listeners and mappings, and
forwarding cached packets on demand.
Functionality that has not yet been integrated into
the Version 2 daemon includes the DHT, the social net-
work, verifying packet signatures, and keeping wireless
interfaces off most of the time.
In contrast, Version 1, which is not interoperable with
Version 2, has a chat client and key exchange program.
The chat client keeps data persistently and offers a very
simple textual interface.
5.2 Future Applications of AllNet
While chat is a wonderful application to begin with,
once AllNet is working well it might be useful for a
number of similar purposes, including web access, email
access, and generalized authentication.
The world wide web can be accessed using text-only
browsers. This kind of access eliminates the need for
high-speed connectivity. From personal experience, text-
based Internet access, while much less stimulating than
full multimedia access, is significantly better than no
access at all. Many large Internet web sites, including
google and wikipedia, provide good support for text-
only access, and if more people were to access the Inter-
net with text only, more web sites might provide better
support. For AllNet to support web access, the crucial
step is finding a device G that has access to the Internet
and is willing to share some of this access.
When using secure http, intermediate devices such as
G would be able to tell which websites were visited, but
not the content of the transmissions.
Similar to web access is the issue of email access.
When the Internet is not otherwise available, it can be
very useful to get even basic email information such as
one summary line per email received. When retrieving
a message, a specific protocol can ensure that no at-
tachments and only the first few bytes of the message
are sent, unless the connection is fast or the data is
explicitly requested.
Once a user’s device has keys, and the user has be-
come accustomed to managing them wisely, such keys
could be used more widely for authentication, particu-
larly for anything which currently requires a password.
There are many applications where the basic data to be
transferred need not be bulky, including online banking,
remote login, and the submission of papers to confer-
ences.
5.3 Future Work
The immediate goal of the AllNet development is to
complete a chat application and a key exchange ap-
plication essentially equivalent to what is available in
Version 1. In addition, we plan to provide the other
components needed for full functionality, including the
DHT, the social network, verifying packet signatures,
and turning off wireless interfaces most of the time.
After this, to make AllNet more attractive to users,
we plan to improve the user interface of the chat appli-
cation and port it to a variety of mobile platforms, espe-
cially Android and iOS, and desktop platforms besides
Linux. We believe users will recognize the advantage
of AllNet over other messaging applications that only
support one or a few kinds of devices.
After we have completed a fully functional chat appli-
cation, we can begin to develop and integrate new pro-
tocols and applications, particularly the web and email
access, and more specialized protocols, for example to
communicate to my social network my status, and es-
pecially the addresses of trusted Rendezvous Points.
There is also much work to be done to evaluate the
protocol and implementation and improve them where
possible. In particular, the social network makes it easy
to offer interpersonal incentives to help others. It would
be interesting to study how much people participate in
AllNet to build a community and its complement of
how much people participate for their own benefit, and
perhaps, how much the two overlap.
5.4 Conclusion
It seems worthwhile to support exchanges of text mes-
sages among people whenever that can be done, with or
without the infrastructure. Such low bit rate commu-
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nication can be extremely useful in a number of cases,
most dramatically in emergencies, but will only be widely
adopted if it is useful for daily communications.
At this point, the design of AllNet is elegant and very
effective, even though a lot remains to be done.
People often get excited about AllNet, believing that
it will lead to a revolution in how everyone communi-
cates. But even if AllNet is wildly successful, ad-hoc
networks don’t scale well. We will still need, use, pay
for, and get the benefits of the infrastructure. We might
see evolution in the market for Internet access rather
than revolution.
What AllNet can and will do is set a baseline of
providing interpersonal communication securely and for
free whenever and wherever possible, motivated not by
profit maximization but by the desire to help people
communicate and to build better communities.
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